What’s the news?
Ramp raised two rounds in less than 45 days. In June it raised $200M at a $16B valuation. In July it raised $500M at a $22.5B valuation led by ICONIQ, with participation from Founders Fund, D1 Capital, GIC, Coatue, Thrive, and General Catalyst. New investors included Sutter Hill, Lightspeed, T. Rowe Price, GV, and Emerson Collective. The company has pointed to AI agents, 45,000 customers, more than $80B in annualized purchase volume, Treasury assets above $1B, and positive cash flow. In September it declared a $1B annualized revenue run rate.
The Bull Case
- Ramp has reached a $1B revenue run rate. That is revenue, not valuation. It signals scale and product-market fit. At a $22.5B valuation, Ramp is trading at about 22.5× sales. Comps: CompanyP/S MultipleVisa~18.9×Mastercard~17.7×Amex~2.99× Amex is an outlier because it carries lending risk on its balance sheet. Visa and Mastercard sit in the high teens. Looking at Ramp’s 22.5× is like saying this could be the next Visa, with some added credit for software features layered on top.
- Ramp has built a customer-friendly business in a sector dominated by incumbents that have been slow to innovate. It already serves 45,000 customers. Expense reports have become a sticky wedge, and there is evidence that customers are adding bill pay, procurement, and travel as well.
- Ramp is building with AI in mind. The newer tools are designed to automate policy enforcement, cut down manual review, and reduce friction. With less legacy baggage than older firms, it should be easier for Ramp to incorporate AI deeply and benefit from it over time.
The Bear Case
While the growth rate of revenue is impressive, the quality is of concern. Ramp has gone from $700M in annualized revenue in March to $1B in September. That is about a 43 percent annualized growth rate over six months.
My strong suspicion is that transaction revenue is still dominant. Ramp is pushing expense reports and other products, but those lines are small today. In late 2024 leadership pointed to card market share numbers that suggested nearly all revenue was tied to cards. More recent messaging has moved away from detailing revenue sources and toward highlighting new products. That shift likely reflects guidance from its communications team to obscure the reliance on cards and support the case for software-like multiples.
Profitability on the card side remains tight. Assume Ramp earns around 2.5 percent on card transactions. About one percentage point goes out to Visa, Mastercard, and other network participants. That leaves 1.5 percent, which Ramp then pays out again in customer rewards. The margin is thin. Float income between when customers earn and redeem rewards helps, but it is highly sensitive to interest rates. If rates fall, so does the contribution.
Float-Business Comparables:
| Company | P/S Multiple |
|---|---|
| Payoneer | ~2.8× |
| Wise | ~7.0× |
| Western Union | ~0.7× |
| Remitly | ~2.8× |
Quick-and-Dirty Valuations
Ramp as a Card Business
| Company | P/S | Growth Rate | Infra Provider? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ramp | 22.5× | ~43% (annualized) | No |
| Mastercard | 17.7× | ~11% revenue growth | Yes |
| Visa | 18.9× | ~14% revenue growth | Yes |
| Amex | 2.99× | ~9% revenue growth | Yes |
| Brex | n/a | n/a | No |
If Ramp sustains growth and achieves more scale, a valuation closer to 15× sales could be more reasonable given it does not own the rails. That would still make it a substantial fraction of Visa’s and Mastercard’s market caps, but not on par.
Ramp as a Float Business
| Company | P/S |
|---|---|
| Ramp | 22.5× |
| Western Union | 0.7× |
| Payoneer | 2.8× |
| Wise | 7.0× |
| Remitly | 2.8× |
If Ramp is primarily a float business, the current multiple looks stretched. These comps show that when profitability depends on float and interest rates, valuations are much lower.
The CFO Superapp Question
Let’s say there is a ton of value in Ramp’s approach to CFO suite tools. Expense reports are already in the product. Bill pay, procurement, and travel are on the roadmap. If Ramp can keep building, maybe it can unseat incumbents like Concur and start to look like a system of record for finance teams.
CFO Superapp Comparables — P/S Multiples
| Company | Business Focus | P/S Multiple (TTM) |
|---|---|---|
| Bill.com | SMB and mid-market AP/AR automation | ~10–11× |
| Workday | Enterprise ERP and finance workflows | ~10× |
| ServiceNow | Enterprise workflow automation | ~11–12× |
Software companies that dominate CFO workflows trade around 10–12× sales. That is well below Ramp’s 22.5×.
It also has to be said: I am doubtful the U.S. market really wants a superapp that consolidates all CFO tools under one roof. China and Latin America have conditions that make superapps thrive. American enterprises tend to prefer modular best-of-breed solutions. If Ramp were to succeed here, it would be truly paradigm shifting.
Toward a Composite Valuation
Ramp’s $1B run-rate is the starting point. If revenue grows conservatively at 25–30 percent per year, then in three years it will land between $1.95B and $2.2B. Averaging those outcomes gives about $2.1B in projected revenue at IPO.
Split that mix by assumption:
- 70 percent cards → $1.47B
- 20 percent float → $420M
- 10 percent superapp → $210M
Apply multiples:
- Cards at 15× = $22.1B
- Float at 3× = $1.3B
- Superapp at 10× = $2.1B
Add them together and the implied equity value is about $25.5B.
Other Forces
If Ramp only IPOs at $25.5B, that is not a venture-scale return. It is not even an especially strong outcome for late-stage growth investors. What I suspect is happening is that venture firms are swimming in the deep end of the pool. In recent years, small and new funds have struggled to raise capital, while brand-name funds have been inundated with money. To deploy these mega funds, firms need to write mega checks. Ramp is clearly a company worthy of large checks, but probably not at the volume or valuations it has attracted. Early-stage investors are now rushing into late-stage rounds because they have to put the capital to work. The result is inflated late-round valuations driven more by fund mechanics than by the underlying risk-reward profile.
Examples of recent fund sizes:
| Firm | Latest Vehicle | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| Founders Fund | Growth III | $4.6B |
| ICONIQ Growth | Growth VII | $5.75B |
| Thrive Capital | 2024 funds | $5B |
| General Catalyst | 2024 funds | $8B |
This backdrop makes it easier to see why Ramp’s valuation climbed quickly.
Shane Wilson's Blog 
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